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REPROSECUTION OF ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS AS
CONSTITUTING DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Early in the English law a common law maxim had developed that no
man should have his life put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.' Today,
this maxim is found incorporated as a provision in the constitutions of 45
states as well as in the Federal Constitution.2 The discussion of double jeop-
ardy herein will be limited to the problem of appeals by the municipality
and the resulting reprosecution of ordinance violation cases after a finding
adverse to a municipal corporation. The related but analytically distinct
areas of double jeopardy, prosecution for split-offenses' and multi-sovereign
prosecutions, 4 will not be emphasized. Included will be a discussion of the
legal status of an ordinance violation and the applicability of other con-
stitutional safeguards besides double jeopardy inextricably necessary to a
thorough understanding of the principal problem.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Even though the broad principle of protection against multiple prose-
cutions evolved centuries ago, protection at that time was minimal in com-
parison with today's standards. 5 Today, the federal courts are bound by the
ambiguous provision of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion which provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." As to the states, the rule of
Palko v. Connecticut,6 decided under this clause of the fifth amendment, re-
mains in force to date. Palko was charged by indictment with first degree
murder but was found guilty by the jury of second degree murder. The
prosecution appealed under a state statute permitting an appeal when
errors are committed in the trial. Palko was retried, found guilty of first
degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court held that the
restrictions imposed on the federal government through the first eight
amendments are not necessarily absorbed into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment as minimum requirements of due process. The Court
held that the states, therefore, are not bound by the fourteenth amendment
to observe the same standards as the fifth amendment, and more specifically
the double jeopardy clause in it, provides for the federal government. It
1 4 Blackstone, Commentaries § 335 (3rd Kerr ed. 1862).
2 Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Vermont do not have
constitutional provisions, but rather have common law decisions achieving the same
effect. See A. L. I., Administration of The Criminal Law 61-72 (1935).
3 See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676 (1959); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S. Ct. 666 (1959).
4 See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 78 S. Ct. 829 (1958); Kirchheimer, The
Act, The Offense & Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513 (1949).
5 See, e.g., 4 Blackstone, Commentaries § 335-36 (3d Kerr ed. 1862), Jeopardy only
attached in crown prosecutions for felonies, and even then not until a final judgment
had been rendered.
6 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (137).
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seems to be left entirely up to the individual state to provide constitutional
or statutory protections for its citizens against reprosecution in a state
criminal proceeding beyond the minimum essentials provided by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as set forth in Palko. However,
as previously noted, most states have their own prohibitions against double
jeopardy. Moreover, recent Supreme Court extensions of the fourteenth
amendment incorporating the Bill of Rights protections appear to make
Palko the next precedent likely to be overruled.
7
The Illinois Constitution has a provision which deals with double
jeopardy8 and which provides that "no person shall. . . be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense." The Illinois constitutional provision against
double jeopardy applies only after jeopardy attaches, however. The first
question is, therefore, when does jeopardy attach? Recent court construction
has decided that the protection against double jeopardy may not be invoked
at least until the entire jury has been impaneled and sworn.9 Thus, in
People v. Watson,'0 the defendant had been indicted for burglary and
larceny. At the arraignment the state entered a "nolle prosequi" as to the
burglary charge. The defendant pleaded guilty to the larceny charge and
was sentenced to one to ten years in prison. Six days later, by agreement of
all parties, this sentence was set aside and the charge of larceny this time
was nolle prosequied and the defendant pleaded guilty to the burglary
charge. He was sentenced to one year to life. On appeal, he asked for a
reversal of the burglary conviction because jeopardy had attached when a
nolle prosequi was entered on the burglary charge at the arraignment. The
court upheld the conviction, holding that a nolle prosequi is not a final dis-
position of the case, but is in the nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance. If
entered before jeopardy has attached it does not serve as an acquittal so as
to prevent a subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy will not attach until the
accused has been arraigned and the entire jury is impaneled and sworn.
Even if one or two panels are sworn, until the entire jury is sworn, no
jeopardy can attach. Thus, at the arrest, arraignment or indictment stages,
jeopardy has not attached. When there is a trial without a jury, a bench
trial, jeopardy attaches upon the swearing of the first witness.'"
Once jeopardy has attached, a culmination of the proceedings on the
merits, either by conviction or acquittal, will bar any attempt at reprose-
7 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964);
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684
(1961); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1960).
8 Ill. Const. art. II, § 10 (1870), provides, "No person shall . . . be twice put in jeop-
ardy for the same offense."
9 People v. Green, 74 I1. App. 2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840 (1st Dist. 1966); People v.
Campbell, 49 Ill. App. 2d 269, 200 N.E.2d 72 (1st Dist. 1964); People v. Jones, 9 111. 2d
481, 138 N.E.2d 522 (1956).
10 394 Ill. 177, 68 N.E.2d 265 (1946).
11 People v. Laws, 29 Ill. 2d 221, 193 N.E.2d 806 (1963).
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cution.12 The test generally applied to determine whether a former convic-
tion or acquittal is a bar to a subsequent prosecution is whether the facts
of the later indictment would, if true, have sustained a conviction on the
earlier indictment. If so, then the previous judgment is a complete bar to
the subsequent prosecution, as in People v. Bain,13 in which case a second
conspiracy indictment recited facts similar to the first indictment. Reprose-
cution can occur in the form of an attempted appeal by the state after an
outcome favorable to the defendant as well as in the usual form of a repeti-
tious reprosecution for the same crime. Any attempted appeal by the state
is expressly forbidden by article six, section seven of the Illinois Constitu-
tion which provides," . . . [A]fter a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no
appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal .... " Nor may the state appeal
from a conviction on the merits, except in a limited number of situations
provided by statute.
14
In addition, once the jury is sworn and jeopardy attaches, a termination
of the prosecution by nonsuit or dismissal of the charges, even though there
has been no trial on the merits, will forever bar prosecution of the offense
charged.' 5 People v. Gallos16 involved a prosecution for theft. The prose-
cutor, believing there was insufficient evidence to sustain the charge, had
the judge dismiss the charges. A short time later the judge reinstated the
charges. On appeal, the court held that these charges could not be reinstated
either before or after the jury was discharged because such action would
violate the defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy.
Another question which may arise is, of what crimes has the defendant
been placed in jeopardy? This question will arise in cases where the in-
dictment charges an offense upon which there may be a conviction on one
or more lesser included offenses. In People v. Carrico,'7 the defendant was
12 People v. Bain, 358 II. 177, 193 N.E. 137 (1935), holds that a judgment of con-
viction is a complete bar to later prosecution on a later indictment charging facts which
would have justified a conviction on the earlier indictment. In addition, it has long been
held that acquittal bars the prosecution of a writ of error by the state in a criminal
proceeding, whether misdemeanor or felony. People v. Minor, 144 Ill. 308, 33 N.E. 40
(1893).
13 358 Ill. 177, 193 N.E. 137 (1935).
14 The factual situation in Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 6, could not arise in
Illinois today. The reason is that the state is permitted an appeal only in certain situa-
tions. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 120-1 (1967), provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this Article and Rules of the Supreme Court the
State may not appeal in a criminal case.
(b) The State may appeal from any court an order or judgment the substantive
effect of which results in:
(1) dismissing an indictment, information or complaint; or
(2) arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or
complaint.
15 In People v. Watson, 394 Ill. 177, 68 N.E.2d 265 (1964), an untried defendant was
freed when the court held that while a nolle prosequi before the jury is sworn is like mere
nonsuit in a civil case, once jeopardy attaches, a "nolle" is an acquittal and the defendant
can never be retried on the same charges.
1a 77 111. App. 2d 53, 221 N.E.2d 782 (Ist Dist. 1966).
17 310 Ill. 543, 142 N.E. 164 (1924).
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indicted for murder. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter, a lesser
included offense. The defendant appealed and the case was reversed and
remanded for a new trial. At the subsequent trial on the same indictment,
the jury was properly instructed that the highest offense that the defendant
could be convicted for was manslaughter. The previous conviction for man-
slaughter was an implied acquittal of the offense of murder. Since jeopardy
had attached, the defendant could not be retried for murder or any offense
greater that that of which he was found guilty at the original trial.
ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS IN PARTICULAR
Ordinance prosecution cases retain the peculiar distinction of being
criminal in nature but civil in proceedings. This classification results in the
conflict in the applicability of civil and criminal rules, especially where re-
prosecution and appeals from trial decisions are involved. There are various
reasons for the retention of the predominance of the civil aspect of ordi-
nance proceedings and thus the resulting application of the civil rules of
procedure. These reasons, along with various legislative changes which may
affect the result, will be discussed next.
Pre-1963 Status
The Illinois Constitution prohibits an accused from being put in
double jeopardy for the "same offense.'I s One way to analyze the problem
is to define "offense." Previous to 1963, The Criminal Code defined "of-
fense" as "a violation of any penal statute of this state."' 9 It is evident that
municipal ordinances are not state statutes and thus were not included
within either the definition of "offense" or the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. There were, however, additional reasons that in-
dicate reprosecution or appeals by the municipality were not considered
double jeopardy.
Legal Nature of an Ordinance
To fully appreciate the status which the ordinance occupies in the law,
an analysis of the legal nature of an ordinance is required. Under the so-
called Dillon rule,2 0 a municipality has only the powers which are either
expressly granted by the state through a charter, or those which are neces-
sarily implied or essential to the operation of the city. Ordinance regulations
18 Supra note 8.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 2-12 (1963). Prior to January 1, 1964, the criminal sub-
stantive and procedural law was contained in the provisions of chapter 38 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes under the heading "Criminal Code," as the new code of 1961 was called.
In 1963, the procedural aspects of the law were separated from the code, and, although
remaining in chapter 38, were placed in a separate section entitled "Code of Criminal
Procedure." Each of the sections contains its own definitions.
20 Dillon, Municipal Corporations § 55 (1st ed. 1892). The rule is derived from
Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa App. 163, at 173 (1868).
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may be passed by virtue of the city's express powers.2' This exercise of
expressly granted power is valid even to the extent of exercising the police
power concurrently with the state.22 These "police power" ordinance regu-
lations may differ from the state's regulations, that is, they may regulate the
same subject matter, but may not be inconsistent with them. 23 The penalty
for violation of an ordinance is limited by statute to a fine of no more than
five hundred dollars.2 4 A jail sentence may be provided, but only as a means
of enforcing payment of the fine.
25
The fact that only a fine may be imposed as punishment for a violation
has caused many to observe the similarity between punitive damages in a
civil case and the imposition of a fine in a criminal case. The fact that
criminal sanctions and punitive damages are substantially identical in
nature and purpose is one rationale for the argument that an ordinance
violation prosecution is a civil proceeding. Punitive damages serve as a
deterrent to future conduct of the same nature, and also serve as public re-
tribution and as a rehabilitative factor. A fine serves the same purposes, but
with perhaps more emphasis on the punitive-deterrent factor.
26
A civil remedy lies to recover a penal fine. 27 The early case of Town of
Jacksonville v. Black28 held that an action of debt would lie to recover a
fine for violation of an ordinance regulating the sale of intoxicating liquor.
The theory that a fine may be recovered by an action of debt or assumpsit,
as in any other civil suit, arose from the practice of collecting fines for vio-
lation of corporate by-laws by a civil suit at common law.
29
One seeming inconsistency is the fact that, in most states, imprisonment
is available as a method of collecting a fine, while, at the same time, the
state constitution, including Illinois', forbids imprisonment for a debt.3 0
To circumvent this objection, the courts have construed "debt" in its con-
stitutional sense to include only the debtor-creditor relation which arises
out of a civil contract.
31
21 Nordine v. Illinois Power Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 424, 199 N.E.2d 34 (4th Dist. 1964).
22 City of Highland Park v. Curtis, 83 Ill. App. 2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870 (2d Dist. 1967).
23 Ibid.
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 1-2-1 (1967). This section also allows a jail sentence not to
exceed six months to enforce the payment of any fine imposed for a violation.
25 Ibid.
26 Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 21 Mod. Rev. 117 (1958);
34 U. of C. L. Rev. 408, 412-415 (1966); see also 38 Wash. L. Rev. 819 (1964)..
27 People v. Dummer 274 Ill. 637, 113 N.E. 934 (1916). See also Atchison, T. & S.
Ry, Co. v. People, 227 II. 270, 81 N.E. 342 (1907), where a railroad was fined for failure
to observe an ordinance requiring prompt use of cars for transporting goods as a common
carrier.
28 36 111. 507 (1864).
29 Ibid.
30 Ill. Const. art. II, § 11 (1870), provides: "no person shall be imprisoned for
debt .. "
31 City of Chicago v. Morrell, 247 Ill. 383, 93 N.E. 295 (1910); Harlow v. Clow, 110
Ore. 257, 223 Pac. 541 (1924). Note also that artide II, section 11 of the Illinois Constitu-
tion allows imprisonment for failure to deliver property to pay a debt.
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The confusion is this area and the impossibility of pigeon-holing this
type of case is aptly illustrated by the following exerpt form City of Clayton
v. Nemours:
3 2
[A] prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance is a civil ac-
tion . . . though concededly resembling a criminal action in its
effects and consequences. Regarding it with respect to both form
and substance, it partakes of some of the features of each character
of action....
In the sense that its primary object is to punish, a prosecution
for the violation of a city ordinance is undoubtedly criminal in its
purpose but nevertheless civil in form, and especially so when re-
garded as an action for the recovery of a debt representing the
amount of the fine or penalty imposed against the defendant for
violation of the ordinance. Where the punishment prescribed by
the ordinance may, in the first instance, be the imprisonment of
the defendant, the conception of the action as one for the recovery
of the debt will of course no longer obtain . . . but even so the pro-
ceeding, though its sole object is to punish, is nevertheless not a
proceeding to punish for the commission of a crime in the accurate
legal sense of the term. This for the reason that a crime is an act
committed in violation of the public law, that is, a law coextensive
with the boundaries of the state which enacts it, while an ordi-
nance, on the contrary, is no more than a mere local police regula-
tion passed in pursuance of and in subordination to the general or
public law for the preservation of peace and the promotion of good
order in a particular locality.
Applicability of Civil or Criminal Rules
Since prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance is deemed to be
a civil proceeding, the rules of civil and not of criminal procedure33 apply.
There are a great many ramifications of this broad statement, including
the resultant inapplicability of the criminal safeguards of the Federal Con-
stitution. Procedural steps, such as arraignment, are not necessary.3 4 The
action is brought in the name of the city, by a complaint which only need
be as specific as the civil practice act requires, and which complaint may be
amended at any time before judgment.
3 5
It is well established that civil litigants are entitled to be represented
by counsel.3 6 Since the proceedings are civil, however, the constitutional
rights in a criminal case to have counsel either appointed or retained are
absent. Moreover, the right to be free from self-incrimination is absent.
32 237 Mo. App. 167, 170 164 S.W.2d 935, 938 (1942).
83 City of Chicago v. Schlensky, 339 Ill. App. 648, 91 N.E.2d 640 (Ist Dist. 1950); Vil-
lage of Skokie v. Schlamm, 339 Ill. App. 143, 89 N.E.2d 73 (1st Dist. 1950). See 15 Am.
Jur., Criminal Law § 360 (1957).
34 City of Chicago v. Walcher, 327 Ill. App. 556, 64 N.E.2d 594 (1st Dist. 1946).
35 City of Chicago v. Morretti, 347 Ill. App. 73, 105 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist. 1952); City
of Chicago v. Kenny, 35 Ill. App. 57 (Ist Dist. 1891).
86 Anderson v. Anderson, 198 S.C. 412, 18 S.E.2d 9 (1942). See also, 7 C.J.S., Attorney
& Client § 62 (1955).
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The only area in which the courts have seen fit to compromise the civil
rules of procedure with the criminal safeguards is in the area of the burden
of proof. In City of Chicago v. Butler,3 7 the city claimed that only the civil
requirement of a preponderance of evidence was necessary to collect a fine
for violation of a smoke abatement ordinance. The defendant claimed that
since the proceeding was criminal in nature, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was necessary. The court compromised and said that more than a
mere preponderance was necessary because the recovery of a penalty was
involved, apparently feeling the predominant punitive factor warranted
this added protection for the defendant. The result is that a "clear pre-
ponderance" of proof was required, a "clear preponderance" being more
than a "preponderance" and less than "beyond a reasonable doubt.
Double Jeopardy in Particular
The majority of cases assume without extended argument that a prose-
cution to collect a fine is a civil proceeding and therefore the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy does not apply. Thus, the double jeop-
ardy provision does not protect a defendant against reprosecution by the
city for the same offense, or from an appeal by the city from a verdict in
the trial court, or from possible prosecution later of a lesser included offense.
However, other civil protections may in fact apply.
There are many cases, including appeal by a city, in which the defen-
dant claims double jeopardy would result from a reprosecution for an ordi-
nance violation after a judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits.
For example, in Village of Maywood v. Houston,3s a Justice of the Peace
found a defendant not guilty of violating a village ordinance making it un-
lawful to maintain a trailer camp in the Village. The Criminal Court of
Cook County dismissed an appeal by the Village on the grounds that a city
may not appeal any errors in the proceedings at the trial. The Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the Village had a right to appeal and remanded
the case to the Criminal Court. The court reviewed the authorities and said
that an ordinance violation case has been customarily and correctly termed
a civil case from which any error at the trial level may be reviewed upon
an appeal by either side.
In a more recent case, the defendant was found guilty of driving while
intoxicated and the court levied a fine.39 The magistrate then suspended
the fine. The Village appealed and the upper court reversed the suspension
of the fine after confirming the Village's right to appeal the conviction and
suspension.
37 350 111. App. 550, 113 N.E.2d 210 (lst Dist. 1953).
38 10 Ill. 2d 117, 139 N.E. 2d 233 (1956). See 10 I.L.P., Cities &r Villages § 1193 (1957);
McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 27.65 (3d ed. rev. 1957); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 120
(1944).
39 Village of Park Forest v. Bragg, 38 Ill. 2d 225, 230 N.E.2d 868 (1967).
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No illustrative cases have been discovered in which a defendant claimed
double jeopardy upon reprosecution for an ordinance violation after the
charges had been dropped or the case terminated by a nolle prosequi. Here,
however, a proper analogy may be made to a civil case in which a defendant
takes a voluntary nonsuit and later refiles his action. The only bar to such
a procedure by a civil litigant would be the running of the applicable statute
of limitations. As for retrial for the same offense, repetitious retrials on the
merits are barred in civil actions because the case becomes res judicata on
its facts.
Another rather sticky problem occurs where two offenses arise out of
the same conduct. In the civil law, the Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter
110, section 44, provides no mandatory joinder of actions. Thus, actions in
simple negligence and for recklessness arising from the same act or conduct
could be brought separately. In the criminal law, however, where two of-
fenses arise out of the same conduct, the Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter
110, section 3-3, provides that both offenses must be prosecuted in the same
action or the one not prosecuted will be barred. Applying the civil rules
which are generally applicable, it appears the defendant could be tried
separately for several different offenses arising out of the same conduct, such
as reckless driving and negligent driving.
Post 1963-The New Code of Criminal Procedure
On January 1, 1964, the new Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 became effective. This Code defines "offense" as "a violation of any
penal ordinance of this state or of any penal ordinance of its political sub-
divisions."40 However, the definition of "offense" in the Illinois Criminal
Code, the substantive criminal law of the state, still excludes the penal
ordinances of the political subdivisions of the state. The question is, has the
change in definition in The Code of Criminal Procedure affected, or will it
affect, the fact that a state can appeal an ordinance violation case, that
criminal safeguards are not applicable to a defendant in such a case and
that the burden of proof is a clear preponderance of the evidence?
Very few cases have raised the exact points. In City of Chicago v. Joyce,
41
the defendant claimed error in the court's failure to instruct the jury that
the violation of a disorderly conduct ordinance must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court held that the burden of proof in ordinance
violation cases remains a "clear preponderance" of the evidence. The court
emphasized that The Criminal Code, which requires proof beyond a reason-
able doubt for conviction of an offense, contains its own definition of "of-
fense" which does not include ordinance violations. Thus, the new definition
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 102-15 (1967), which Code of Criminal Procedure con-
tains all the procedural aspects of the criminal law.
41 38 II. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 289 (1967).
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of "offense," as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, has no effect
on the burden of proof required.
On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held that
the complaint in all ordinance violation cases must be verified, as in all
criminal cases.4 2 This is the only semblance of an extension of the criminal
rules into the area of ordinance violations since the change in the definition
of "offense."
Some recent cases have involved the problem of double jeopardy in
ordinance violations under the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Gibson
City v. McClellan4s held without discussion that a village could no longer
appeal in light of the enlarged scope of "offense" and Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604, regulating appeals in criminal cases. However, in Tlillage of
Park Forest v. Bragg,44 the defendant was found guilty of driving while
intoxicated. The magistrate suspended the fine, from which order the
Village appealed. The defendant contended that under the new and broader
definition of "offense" in the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure the
Village cannot appeal because Illinois Supreme Court Rule 60445 enumer-
ates the decisions from which the state may appeal in criminal cases, and
the present case was not included in those enumerated. The defendant cited
the Gibson City case in support of his position. The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that Rule 604 applies only to appeals by the state and not its
subdivisions, and that rule 604 applies only to criminal cases. An ordinance
violation, while included within the new definition of "offense," is not
included within the scope of a "criminal case." "Offense" has a wide scope
and includes both criminal cases and ordinance violations, and therefore
is not synonymous with "criminal case." Thus, Rule 604 does not prevent
an appeal by the state in a non-criminal, ordinance violation case. The
court proceeded to reverse the holding of the Gibson City case and restore
the viability of the rule that a city may appeal an ordinance case and the
defendant is not subjected thereby to double jeopardy. The court expressly
mentioned that the opinion is to stand as precedent for questions of double
jeopardy only and it refused to examine whether the legislature intended
new application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in other areas involv-
ing ordinance violations.
It was not argued that since "offense" now includes ordinance violation
cases, that this type of case is brought within the constitutional prohibition
42 People v. Harding, 34 Ill. 2d 475, 216 N.E.2d 147 (1966). Verification of the com-
plaint is required under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 111-3(b) (1967).
43 61 Ill. App. 2d 218, 209 N.E.2d 363 (4th Dist. 1965).
44 Supra note 39.
45 Adopted pursuant to and in substantially the same language as Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
38, § 120-1(1967), as set forth supra note 12, and providing:
-. the State may appeal only from an order or judgment, the substantive effect
of which results in dismissing an indictment, information or complaint; arresting
judgment because of an defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing
an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence. ...
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against double jeopardy for the same "offense." 46 The court apparently
tacitly assumed that "offense," as used in this section of the Constitution, is
defined narrowly as set forth in the Criminal Code, which includes only
"criminal cases," rather than broadly, as in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
CONCLUSION
It is not unforeseeable that the Supreme Court of the United States
should make the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applicable
to the states as a minimum essential of due process. This decision would
immediately overrule Palko v. Connecticut4 7 and no state could appeal an
adverse decision, regardless of any state statute or court rule to the con-
trary. However, in the absence of a change in the present status of an
ordinance prosecution from civil to criminal, this type of case would re-
main immune to all arguments of double jeopardy. However, in view of
the fact that a guilty and indigent defendant is faced with imminent im-
prisonment to enforce a fine which he is unable to pay, it is quite possible
and often urged that additional criminal safeguards should be afforded to
such a defendant even though the courts continue to characterize the
ordinance violation cases as civil.
ALLYN A. BROOKS
46 Il. Const. art. II, § 10 (1867).
47 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1947).
